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Abstract
Previous research has shown that the typical or memory color of an object is perceived in images of that object, even when
the image is achromatic. We performed an experiment to investigate whether the implied color in greyscale images could
influence the perceived color of subsequent, simple stimuli. We used a standard top-up adaptation technique along with
a roving-pedestal, two-alternative spatial forced-choice method for measuring perceptual bias without contamination from
any response or decision biases. Adaptors were achromatic images of natural objects that are normally seen with diagnostic
color. We found that, in some circumstances, greyscale adapting images had a biasing effect, shifting the achromatic point
toward the implied color, in comparison with phase-scrambled images. We interpret this effect as evidence of adaptation in
chromatic signaling mechanisms that receive top-down input from knowledge of object color. This implied color adaptation
effect was particularly strong from images of bananas, which are popular stimuli in memory color experiments. We also
consider the effect in a color constancy context, in which the implied color is used by the visual system to estimate an
illuminant, but find our results inconsistent with this explanation.
Keywords Color and light: color · Color and light: constancy · Adaptation and aftereffects
Introduction
The mechanisms in the peripheral visual pathway that
support human color vision are reasonably well understood:
signals from three classes of cone photoreceptor (long-,
medium-, and short-wavelength sensitive, or L, M, and
S), tuned to different regions of the visible spectrum are
combined by specific populations of ganglion cells in the
retina in an opponent fashion. These ganglion cells project
to the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) and from there
signals are sent to the cortex. However, it has been suggested
that what we see is not only determined by the optic array
(the pattern of light reaching our eyes) but is also partly
determined by knowledge or prior experience of the world
and an estimate of the relative likelihood of possible stimuli.
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The debate on the bottom-up vs. the top-down nature of
vision has been ongoing through much of modern vision
science and continues today (Firestone & Scholl, 2016).
Relatively recently, more evidence had been provided for
top-down inputs to color perception, and we discuss some of
this below. In the experiment we describe here, we attempt
to determine whether the typical bias from expected colors
of objects, known to affect color vision when that color is
not present, lasts beyond the presentation of that stimulus, in
a way analogous to traditional chromatic adaptation in the
peripheral mechanisms.
Memory color affects color perception
For some time, it has been suggested that the remembered
typical color of an object—“memory color” (as opposed
to “color memory”, simply remembering colors, Bartleson
1960; Hering 1964)—can affect the perceived color of that
object. One of the earliest people to make this suggestion
was Hering (1964, p. 8), who went as far as to suggest
that the memory color seen in a “fleeting glance” could
replace the perception of another color, depending on
attention. Several studies have shown that the typical or
diagnostic color (Tanaka & Presnell, 1999; Biederman
& Ju, 1988) of an object can have an effect on the
perception of that object’s color. These experiments use
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stimulus images featuring natural objects (often fruit and
vegetables, Bannert & Bartels 2013; Hansen, Olkkonen,
Walter, & Gegenfurtner, 2006; Olkkonen, Hansen, &
Gegenfurtner, 2008) that have a typical color, objects that
are familiar to the particular observer (Bloj, Weiß, &
Gegenfurtner, 2016), and/or objects with popular branding
or symbolism (e.g., road signs, Witzel, Valkova, Hansen,
& Gegenfurtner, 2011). The effects can go beyond the
perceived color of the object, for example it has been shown
that scenes are better recognized when they contain objects
in their diagnostic colors (Goffaux, Jacques, Mourax,
Oliva, Schyns, & Rossion, 2005). The perceived colors of
after-images, created by viewing color-inverted images of
recognizable objects, have also been shown to be affected by
the expected color of the object, and this can be modulated
by an estimate of the precision of the signal (which is low
for after-images, as they are unstable, Lupyan 2015).
In experiments in which observers were asked to
adjust an image of an object with diagnostic color to be
achromatic, they usually selected colors that were opposite
(on the opposite side of the achromatic point in color
space) from that color (Hansen et al., 2006; Olkkonen et al.,
2008; Witzel et al., 2011; Lupyan, 2015). This is consistent
with having to ‘over-compensate’ to negate the chromatic
perception caused by the familiar color of the object. This
effect was reduced when the stimuli were made less realistic
by having their texture reduced or made into outline shapes
only (Olkkonen et al., 2008). In addition, the color of the
objects used in these experiments is remembered with more
saturation and lightness than typical examples (Bartleson,
1960; Delk & Fillenbaum, 1965) or the specific items
known to the observer (Bloj et al., 2016).
When greyscale images of color-diagnostic images are
shown to observers, it has been shown that the memory color
can be predicted from neural activity in the primary visual cor-
tex (V1, Bannert & Bartels 2013) and the authors concluded
that this region is receiving signals about the prior knowledge
of object colors, possibly as feedback from area V4.
Color constancy
We see objects because light from an illumination source
reflects from their surface and into our eyes. The spectral
composition of this light is determined by both the
illuminant and the surface reflectance properties, but in
general we see surfaces as being the same color in different
illumination conditions. This is one, perhaps too restricted,
definition of color constancy (Smithson, 2005; D’Zmura &
Lennie, 1986; Foster, 2011; Hurlbert, 1998). The problem
of recovering the surface properties is a difficult one for
the visual system, and there are many suggestions of how
the illuminant might be estimated in order to be discounted
from the proximal stimulus, using chromatic information
distributed in space or time in the stimulus. Another way
that this might be done is by comparing the chromatic
signal to the expected color determined by the diagnostic
color of an object, and assuming the difference is caused
by the chromaticity of the illuminant. This was also part
of Hering’s (1964, p. 17) observations on memory colors.
A bias of the signal towards the expected object color
could then be applied to the rest of the scene to achieve
color constancy. Memory color has been experimentally
investigated in a color constancy context, and any effect of
familiar objects is small (Granzier & Gegenfurtner, 2012;
Kanematsu & Brainard, 2014).
Chromatic adaptation
Much of what we know about the peripheral mechanisms of
color vision comes from studying adaptation or habituation.
Continued stimulation of a particular mechanism reduces
the activity of that mechanism relative to others. This can be
done selectively and the effects measured in psychophysical
experiments (see for reviews Clifford et al. 2007). It can
readily be shown that adaptation to a colored stimulus for
only a few seconds produces negative after images that also
last seconds. This kind of adaptation, which we-refer to
as “normalization”, has the effect of making the adapting
stimulus appear closer to neutral and occurs in systems
where the stimulus dimension is encoded by broadband
mechanisms (such as the spectral sensitivities of the cones),
rather than a larger number of narrowly tuned mechanisms
(see Webster 2011, for discussion) where the effect can
sometimes be opposite.
In color vision, adaptation can be shown to both the time-
averaged magnitude of a stimulus and to the amount of vari-
ation (contrast adaptation, see Webster 1996, for review),
and has been used as a tool to study the nature of pro-
cessing in the system. For example, Krauskopf, Williams,
and Heeley (1982) adapted observers to chromatic
modulations in different directions in color space and
demonstrated that thresholds for detecting subsequent col-
ors could be elevated selectively in only two directions—the
cardinal axes of color space, which are determined by the
responses of the opponent mechanisms. The comparison of
cone signals by different classes of retinal ganglion cells
(RGCs), which project to the lateral geniculate nucleus
(LGN), results in the perceptually opposite colors. The L-M
mechanism roughly encodes redness vs. greenness, and the
S-(L+M) mechanism roughly encodes blueness vs. yellow-
ness, although these colors are not the same as the unique
hues. The color visual system has a perceptual “norm”,
when signals might be considered in balance and stimuli
appear achromatic (Webster & Leonard, 2008), although
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this can vary between individuals. In the experiment we
describe here, we are particularly concerned with the first
kind of adaptation, to the steady or time-averaged stimu-
lus. Viewing a predominantly yellow stimulus for a few
seconds, for example, produces a blue after-image when
subsequently viewing an objectively neutral field. The effect
is most easily demonstrated with a discrete stimulus that
creates an after-image, but a chromatically biased scene will
have the effect of adapting the whole visual field, producing
a perceptual color bias. This kind of normalization has been
shown to result from gain-control-like processes in vari-
ous stages of the chromatic pathway, including in the cones
themselves (Valeton & van Norren, 1983) and the RGCs
(Zaidi, Ennis, Cao, & Lee, 2012), although other observed
effects suggest that a component of adaptation is cortical
(e.g., Shimojo, Kamitani, & Nishida, 2001; Zeki, Cheadle,
Pepper, & Mylonas, 2017). Further experiments, including
reanalysis of the original data from (Krauskopf et al., 1982)
by Krauskopf, Williams, Mandler, and Brown (1986), sug-
gest that there are additional mechanisms, possibly later in
the pathway than the opponent ones that are tuned to dif-
ferent hues (Eskew, 2009), but little is known about how
adaptation in these “higher-order mechanisms” would affect
perception.
Adaptation is traditionally thought of as being driven
by bottom-up input from sensation. However, in this
experiment, we are more interested in the potential adapting
effects from top-down input, originating from memory
color. We would not like to speculate about whether this
occurs at any of the stages of the system that we know
of, and it does seem unlikely that it occurs in any of the
peripheral, opponent mechanisms. Nevertheless, the LGN
does receive input from V1 (Fitzpatrick, Usrey, Schofield,
& Einstein, 1994), so it is not impossible that top-down
driven adaptation does take place here.
Adaptation takes place in many perceptual modalities,
not limited to color or even vision. Mechanisms sensitive
to stimulus motion can be adapted with a stimulus with
continuous motion in one direction, so that subsequent
stationary stimuli appear to drift in the opposite direction
to the adapter (Mather, Verstraten, & Anstis, 1998).
Particularly relevant to our current work, viewing static
photographs of moving subjects (e.g., running figures)
is also claimed to produce motion adaptation, affecting
perceived direction of subsequent stimuli composed of
drifting dots (Winawer, Huk, & Boroditsky, 2008). These
stimuli with implied motion have an effect analogous to the
effect we aimed to produce in our experiment, but it has
been said that the measured effect is actually a result of a
shift in the observers’ decision criterion, not a perceptual
bias (Morgan, Melmoth, & Solomon, 2013; Mather &
Sharman 2015). We use a methodology designed to avoid
this problem and measure a true perceptual bias, as will be
described later.
Rationale
We might expect that viewing images of objects that
have a typical, diagnostic color will affect the perception
of not just the chromaticities in those images, but also
the chromaticities in subsequent stimuli, even when those
images of objects are made achromatic. We suggest two
subtly different reasons why this might be the case,
that each cause chromatic biases in different directions:
‘normalization’ and ‘illuminant compensation’. Firstly,
knowledge of color might provide input to color vision
mechanisms at some level—not necessarily the peripheral
mechanisms mentioned above—adjusting their gain to
cause a chromatic bias in perception that lasts beyond the
adaptors. A greyscale image of a typically yellow object
might provide excitation in a mechanism that responds to
yellow, in a similar (but likely much reduced) way to a
naturally colored image. Adaptation will occur, the output
of the mechanism will be reduced, and subsequent stimuli
will then appear biased away from yellow—towards blue
according to opponent models of color perception—neutral
stimuli would appear more blue or yellow stimuli would
appear more neutral. This could also be considered as a
shift in the neutral point towards yellow. Alternatively,
if the visual system uses memory color to estimate
illuminant chromaticity in order to discount it, then viewing
the greyscale image of a typically yellow object would
suggest an extremely blue-biased illuminant, resulting in
an achromatic reflection. Subsequent stimuli might still
be perceived as if under this blue illuminant, if presented
within a short time afterwards, as it takes the visual
system some time to adjust to a different illuminant (Lee,
Dawson, & Smithson, 2012). The perceptual effect of the
resulting compensation would be opposite to the effect
of the normalization just described. Subsequent neutral
chromatic stimuli would appear yellow, just as the adapting
stimulus was, so the overall biasing effect is yellow (or a
shift in the neutral point towards blue). In this experiment,
we aimed to directly test whether achromatic images
of typically colored objects, images with implied color,
can cause normalization-like or illuminant-compensation-
like perceptual chromatic biases in subsequent, simple,
stimuli. The chromatic direction of any such bias might
indicate which of the above routes is the cause. However,
we do not anticipate that the stimuli we use will be
particularly effective in causing an illuminant bias, for
reasons we discuss later, nor is illuminant discounting the
only way that color constancy might be achieved. We used
a standard top-up adaptation experiment paradigm, with
Atten Percept Psychophys
methodology designed to remove the effect of response
bias or any strategy based on the semantic content of
the images.
Method
Observers
Four observers participated in this experiment. One was
male, the others female. All had normal color vision (as
verified with Ishihara’s Test for Color Deficiency), and
normal or corrected-to-normal acuity. One observer was
one of the authors, and has knowledge of color theory and
color space, and another observer was experienced with
psychophysics experiments but not color, specifically. The
final two observers were less experienced in psychophysical
observations. Each observer contributed between 5 and
16 hours of time to data collection. The study received
clearance from University of Lincoln school of Psychology
Research Ethic Committee.
Stimuli
Adapting images were images of natural objects. The
objects were chosen because they are predominantly a par-
ticular color, yet can still be identified when they are
greyscale. The objects we selected were: bananas, carrots,
leaves, and cucumbers (Fig. 1). In the first round of data col-
lection, we used only the first three objects. The cucumber
images were used later, in an attempt to understand unex-
pected effects from the leaves. The original images to
be used as adaptors were found from Internet searches,
and chosen because they met the following criteria: The
images contained many examples of the object, such that the
whole image was filled with examples; there were no other
objects in the scene; the images were of sufficiently high
pixel resolution that they did not appear pixelated on the
experiment monitor. We made these decisions because we
wanted images that did not contain other objects or surfaces
that might provide a reference against which the color of the
adapting objects may be judged or the illuminant estimated.
Some images found that met these requirements were very
large, and were split to create more than one stimulus image.
Images were cropped as necessary to fit the 4:3 aspect ratio
of the experimental monitor. Finally, the images were con-
verted from RGB color to greyscale (MATLAB’s rgb2gray
function), and scaled in luminance so that the mean of all
adapting images was the same, and the same luminance as
the probe stimuli (see below).
The adapting images for the control conditions were made
by randomizing the phases of the Fourier components of the
original images. The control images therefore contained the
same Fourier amplitude components, and approximately the
same luminance distributions, as the original images.
Probe stimuli were comprised of a disc, approximately
1◦ visual angle in diameter, divided into semicircles by a
narrow vertical black line (see Fig. 2). The two segments
were assigned chromaticities from either a ‘pedestal’ or a
corresponding ‘pedestal plus test’ set.
Fig. 1 Examples of the adapting images used in the experiment. Each
column shows an image from one of the four sets (bananas, carrots,
leaves, cucumbers), and each row shows the different modifications of
each image. The top row shows the original images in full color, which
were not used in the experiment. The middle row shows the original
images in greyscale, as used in one condition of the experiment. The
bottom row shows the phase-scrambled versions of the images in the
middle row, as used in the control conditions
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Fig. 2 The configuration for the apparatus in the experiment, from the
point of view of the observer. The monitor is surrounded by black card
baffles to remove any view of the rest of the room. The colour probe
stimulus is shown, not to scale
All colors for the probe stimuli were defined in CIE
L∗a∗b∗ space and converted to appropriate RGB values.
CIE L∗a∗b∗ was used, as it is intended to be more
perceptually uniform—the Euclidean distance between two
points corresponds to a perceptual difference that is
approximately the same in any part of the space—than
any of the spaces based on the physiological mechanisms.
Conversion to RGB was done by transforming CIE L∗a∗b∗
values to CIE (1931) XYZ values, and calculating the
corresponding RGB values using the spectral measurements
of the monitor. The pedestal set had three colors, one was
grey (L∗a∗b∗ = (100, 0, 0)), and the others were slightly
red and green in half of the sessions (L∗a∗b∗ = (100, 1, 0)
and (100,−1, 0), respectively) and slightly yellow and blue
(L∗a∗b∗ = (100, 0, 1) and (100, 0,−1), respectively) in
the other half of the sessions. There was a separate test set
for each pedestal, containing eight offsets from the pedestal,
centered on zero offset and equally spaced over 5.0 units
in L∗a∗b∗ space in the color direction being used in the
session. With this range of colors used, the appearances of
the pedestal and test plus pedestal colors were very similar
and the task was difficult. One observer in particular was
unable to make the perceptual decision with any degree of
certainty, and so the range of the chromaticities was doubled
for this observer.
The luminance of the grey pedestal, relative to which
all other colors were specified, was 26.6cdm−2. All other
pedestal and test chromaticities had the same luminance, as
L* values were the same for all these stimuli.
Apparatus
All stimuli were presented on a Sony Trinitron G400 CRT
driven by a CRS (Cambridge Research Systems, Rochester,
Kent, UK) VSG 2/5 providing 14-bit per channel chromatic
resolution. The display was gamma-corrected using a CRS
ColorCAL, and spectral measurements were made with a
JETI Specbos 1211 (JETI Technische Instrumente GmbH,
Jena, Germany). Observers viewed the display from a
distance of 60 cm while resting on a chin-rest, so the
whole display subtended 34 × 26 degrees of visual angle.
Observers gave their responses with a button box. Black
baffles surrounded the monitor and the observer to prevent
stray light from the monitor illuminating other objects in the
room, which was otherwise dark (see Fig. 2).
Procedure
Each experimental session began with an initial adaptation
period of 120s. This consisted of adapting images presented
at the rate of 5 per second, in a randomized order. The
sequence of trials then began immediately. Each trial
consisted of the presentation of adapting images for 4 s
(again at 5 Hz in a randomized order). This was followed
by a 100-ms black interval, then the probe stimulus for
300 ms, and a second 100-ms black interval. The period
of adaptation images for the next trial began immediately
(Fig. 3), and the observer had the first 2 s of this period to
give their response. The presentation rate meant that each
image was displayed for 200 ms, more than long enough
for object identification with color photographs and line
drawings (Biederman & Ju, 1988), but not long enough to
result in after images. The sequence of each trial meant that
there was no period where the routine paused to wait for a
response, so any adapting effect was maintained as much
as possible, but there was enough time between each probe
stimulus to make the task possible for the observer.
The observer’s task was to decide which of the two halves
of the probe stimulus was least saturated or “most like
grey” and respond by pressing the corresponding one of two
buttons.
The procedure to measure chromatic bias was analogous
to that used by Morgan (2014) and Morgan, Grant,
Melmoth, and Solomon (2015) to measure orientation
perception bias and by Mather and Sharman (2015) and
Morgan, Schreiber, and Solomon (2016) to measure speed
perception bias. One-half of the probe was assigned to be
the ‘pedestal’ and one was the ‘pedestal plus test’. This
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Fig. 3 The sequence of stimuli in one trial of the experiment. Greyscale images, either from one of the sets of images of typically colored images,
or from the set of phase-scrambled controls, were shown in a random order, 5 per second for 4 seconds. A 0.1-s black frame followed, and this
was followed by the probe stimulus (see description in text) for 0.3 s
assignment was randomly determined for each trial, and
the observer was not aware of which was which. In each
session, there were three pedestal values used, and eight
test values per pedestal. Each combination was repeated ten
times per session, giving 240 trials per session. Separate
sessions were used for each combination of adapting image
set, adapting or control condition (see below) and chromatic
direction (a∗ and b∗, roughly red-green and yellow-blue).
Each session was repeated 1–3 times, giving between 10 and
30 repeats of each unique trial and 3840 to 11,520 total trial
per observer. Each session lasted approximately 20 min.
Sessions were run in a paired fashion so that a session of the
control condition was run with only a short break preceding
or following the corresponding adapting images session.
Results
For each observer, image category (bananas, carrots,
leaves, cucumbers), experimental condition (images or
phase scrambled control), color direction and pedestal, we
calculated the proportion of times the ‘pedestal plus test’
color was chosen as least saturated. These proportions, as
functions of the pedestal (p) plus test (t) chromaticity, were
fitted by a modified version of the function used by (Morgan
et al., 2016):
Pr(“p + t ′′) = 1
2
(
1 + erf
[
2μ − p − t
2σ
]
erf
[
t − p
2σ
])
separately for each of the pedestals and for each of the two
a∗ and b∗ chromatic axes. Figure 4 shows a representative
example of the three functions fitted to data for one
observer, image set condition, and color direction. The
complete set of plots, including r2 values corresponding to
the fits, can be found in the Supplementary Material. Some
features of these plots are important: if the test were zero
(i.e. pedestal and pedestal plus test were the same, which
did not actually occur in our experiment) we would expect
observers to indicate that the pedestal plus test was least
saturated as often as they indicate the pedestal. The fitted
curves are constrained to pass through the 0.5 proportion at
the chromaticity of the corresponding pedestals (indicated
by the vertical dashed lines) and they appear to fit the data
well. This anchor need not be the peak of the curve, although
it is expected that the peak will be around this point in the
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Fig. 4 Example response proportions and fitted psychometric func-
tions from one observer, for the b∗ (yellow-blue) chromatic direction
and banana stimuli. Separate panels show data from trials with differ-
ent pedestal chromaticities. Left panel: blue (b∗ = −1). Center panel:
neutral (b∗ = 0). Right panel: yellow (b∗ = 1). The vertical axes are
the proportions of times that the observer responded that the pedestal
plus test stimulus (as opposed to the pedestal) was more neutral, for
each of the pedestal plus test chromaticities on the horizontal axis.
Data for the control condition (phase-scrambled images) are shown
with square symbols and fitted with solid curves. Data from the image
condition are shown with x symbols and fitted with dashed curves. Ver-
tical dotted lines indicate the chromaticities of the pedestals, and the
horizontal dotted line indicates the proportion at which the observer is
equally likely to choose the pedestal plus test or pedestal
case of the control condition with neutral (a∗ = 0 and
b∗ = 0) pedestals.
We are specifically interested in the effect that the
adapting images had on the chromatic bias (or achromatic
point), in relation to the controls. This is shown by a shift
in the position of the peaks of the psychometric functions
(difference between the solid and dotted functions in Fig. 4),
which will be accompanied by a change in height (since they
must pass through Pr(“p + t ′′) = 0.5 at the chromaticity
of the pedestal). Our experimental prediction, in the case of
the ‘normalization’ explanation, is that the curves will shift
in the direction towards the implied color of the adapting
images. For example, this would generally be in the +b∗
direction for bananas. Indeed, such a shift can be seen
in Fig. 4 as a rightward shift from the solid curves to
the dashed curves. To obtain a measure of these shifts,
we take the fitted μ parameters of the fitted curves and
calculate the difference between these parameters for data
from corresponding adapter and control conditions. We
average the three separate shifts obtained from the three
pedestals within each combination of other variables. This
gives us two-dimensional (a∗, b∗) shift estimates for each
observer and for each image category. These shifts are
plotted in Fig. 5, where the directions and magnitudes can
be seen, separately for each observer and as an average
over observers. Particularly for the bananas and carrots
image sets, the achromatic shift is in a direction in color
space close to the direction of the predominant color of the
original images. This is true for all the individual observers,
with some variation. One observer shows a very small shift
in the carrots condition, and this reduces the size of the mean
shift vector for that condition. For the leaves and cucumbers
adapting image sets, the magnitude of the shift is often not
as great as for the bananas and carrots, and the direction is
not consistent with that of the typical green colors of leaves
and cucumbers.
The fitted curves also allow us to estimate the just-
noticeable-differences (JNDs) from the σ parameter. These
were fairly consistent within each observer, and the average
over all conditions and observers was 0.74.
Discussion
We have shown that biases in color perception occur after
viewing achromatic images of objects that typically have a
specific color. In some cases, this bias is similar in effect
to the adaptation that occurs after adaptation to chromatic
stimuli. The perceptual shift was measured against a
control condition in which the only difference was in the
Fourier phase components of the adapting images. Since we
compare chromatic judgements after viewing the images of
objects to judgements after viewing the same images with
phase scrambling, we control for any differential adaptation
that might arise from the differences in the spatial contrast
sensitivity of the chromatic mechanisms in the peripheral
visual system (Mullen, 1985). Since the phase information
itself is unlikely to have a biasing effect on color perception,
we must assume that the biases we observe come from the
semantic content in the non-scrambled images.
Atten Percept Psychophys
Fig. 5 Chromatic biases for all observers in the constant-lightness
plane of CIE L∗a∗b∗ space. Each colored symbol, connected to the
origin by a thin colored line, shows the chromatic vector representing
the perceptual bias resulting from viewing the adapting images. These
shifts are calculated from the differences between the mean (μ)
parameters of the function fitted to response proportions (see Fig. 4).
Biases are shown for each observer separately, distinguished by the
plot symbols. Data from the different adapting image sets are shown
with different colored symbols: solid yellow for bananas, solid red for
carrots, solid green for leaves and open green for cucumbers. The large
+ symbols, connected to the origin with thick black lines, indicate
the mean over all observers and the standard error of that mean. Their
color again corresponds to the image set (with a dashed cross for
cucumbers). The thin colored dashed lines indicate the vectors towards
the mean chromaticities of the original versions of the images used as
adaptors, and are displayed in that color
How the visual systemmight use implied color
For at least some of the stimulus image sets (bananas and
carrots), the bias is consistent with the memory color of
objects having a normalizing input to chromatic perception,
by adapting mechanisms that respond to implied chromatic
input. The chromatic direction in which the neutral point
shifts is, on average, towards the typical colors of the objects
in the adapting images. There is some spread around these
directions, but this is to be expected since the observers
never saw the original colors of the images and there are
likely to be differences between individuals. However, the
magnitudes of the shift for the carrots images are smaller
than that of the bananas. Furthermore from the two image
sets of typically green objects, leaves and cucumbers, we
again see generally smaller biases than those from bananas
and these biases are in various directions. Many show
a shift in the roughly red-purple direction. Considering
only the directions of the shifts, this is opposite to what
would be predicted by normalization to the implied green,
and more consistent with a color constancy illuminant
compensation paradigm in which the visual system is
discounting a red illuminant (responsible for making the
green objects achromatic). It is not immediately clear why
the different adapting images have effects consistent with
different explanations, however there are some points to
highlight.
That the visual system explicitly estimates the illuminant
and discounts it is questionable (for evidence against,
see Granzier, Brenner, & Smeets, 2009; Rutherford &
Brainard 2002), and by no means the only way that color
constancy might be achieved. Even if such a mechanism
were in operation, we would expect that any estimation
of a biased illumination from our adaptation stimuli
would be quite weak. It is highly unlikely for a color-
biased scene, such as any of the original images we used
before they were transformed to greyscale, to be rendered
completely achromatic and varying only in luminance by
any plausible illumination. Such an illumination would
need to be accurately specified both spectrally and spatially
to achieve this. Additionally, as mentioned above, the
addition of diagnostic color objects to scenes has been
shown to improve color constancy very little. Perhaps more
importantly, estimating the illuminant in this way would be
weakened by other putative mechanisms of color constancy
that operate on the lower-level chromatic information in
the stimuli. One of the likely ways that the illuminant is
estimated is from the average chromaticity of the scene,
assuming that on average surfaces have neutral reflectance
spectra (e.g., Land 1983, 1986). This would result in a
neutral estimate from all our adaptation stimuli, including
the controls, and so would not produce any shift in the
neutral point. Our scenes do not include objects other than
the ones we selected, so do not show the chromatic bias that
would be introduced by a biased illuminant.
The typical yellow of bananas lies close to the yellow
region of the daylight axis, which runs in a roughly blue
to yellow direction (parallel to the b∗ axis in Fig. 5). It has
been suggested that color constancy uses natural illuminants
as a prior, and more readily compensates for illuminants
that vary in chromaticity on the daylight axis (Brainard,
Longere, Delahunt, Freeman, Kraft, & Xiao, 2006; Pearce,
Crichton, Mackiewicz, Finlayson, & Hurlbert, 2014), but
this is still under debate (e.g., Delahunt & Brainard 2004).
Witzel et al. (2011) found memory color effects that were
stronger for colors more closely aligned with the daylight
axis, but Olkkonen et al. (2008) reject this explanation for
their results. In our case, the direction of bias after adapting
to images of bananas is inconsistent with a mechanism
in which the visual system is discounting an illuminant.
Illuminant-compensation might be responsible for some
of the results from the typically green adaptors but the
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direction of shift, while compatible with the colors involved,
is roughly orthogonal to the daylight axis and so does not
benefit from any increased compensation possible in this
direction.
One reason why testing the natural illuminants hypothe-
sis is difficult in this context is that we know of no studies
that use images of natural objects that are typically blue, or
at least blue but still identifiable when made grayscale. Per-
haps the most obvious example of blue in nature is the sky,
but an image containing only blue sky would likely not be
identifiable when converted to greyscale. Memory color for
blue objects has been investigated with man-made objects
(Bannert & Bartels, 2013; Bloj et al., 2016; Witzel et al.,
2011), but this would have been difficult to achieve in our
experiment in which we chose to use natural objects so that
they would be familiar to any observer, and many images
filled with many examples of those objects.
It is possible that both a normalization mechanism and
an illuminant discounting mechanism are in operation and
working against each other. If this is the case, then they
are unlikely to be perfectly balanced in their effects and the
perceptual biases we see are the net effects. In the cases of
the bananas and carrots, the implied-color adaptation has a
greater effect than the illuminant compensation, and vice-
versa for the leaves images. It is not clear why this should
be the case, but we do note below that bananas seem to
produce particularly strong memory-color effects. It is also
conceivable that the two mechanisms operate in sequence,
for example with illuminant estimation from inputs taking
place after the effects of adaptation to implied color,
and again interacting based on the relative effectiveness
of each. However, we do not believe that we can make
any interpretations about the sequence of operation from
this experiment or dataset. They must depend on signals
originating after the stage at which objects are recognized,
however.
We describe the shift directions from our green-implying
adaptors as being opposite to that expected from adaptation,
but this is only the case if we consider a traditional color
space with opponent axes, as a representation analogous
to the peripheral color-vision mechanisms. If we are
accomplishing something like adaptation, we have no
reason to assume that this occurs at such a peripheral
opponent stage. Conceivably, the adaptation might occur at
a higher-order (i.e., more central) stage, which does not have
the same opponent properties. As mentioned above, systems
composed of many narrowly tuned mechanisms can have
adapting effects in the opposite direction to normalisation
and the suggested central site might encode hue in this
way. However, it is still difficult to imagine how adaptation
to a “green” signal would result in the achromatic point
moving in the red direction, yet a “yellow” signal moves
it in the yellow direction. It is possible that the variation
in strength and consistency that we see in our measured
adaptation effects is because the implied color of some
stimuli, bananas in particular, closely matches the preferred
color of a particular higher-order mechanism in all our
observers, more so than cucumbers. It is also quite possible
that using chromatic directions aligned with the adapted
mechanisms, rather than the axes of CIE L*a*b* that
we arbitrarily chose to test, would reveal more consistent
effects, but since we know little about this hypothetical stage
of the color visual system this would be challenging.
Any perceptual effect from implied color must come
from an observer’s knowledge of the typical colors of
objects, gained through experience. The colors of natural
objects such as the ones in our stimuli vary, but we expect
the experience with them to be relatively consistent among
our observers. All observers grew up and live in the United
Kingdom, where bananas are almost always yellow when
seen for sale. Similarly, carrots are almost always orange.
Cucumbers are common, and similarly shaped items (e.g.,
courgette, marrow) are also green. Leaves, on the other
hand, are often various stages of red, orange, or brown.
The majority of data were collected in the spring and
summer months when the vast majority of leaves in the
United Kingdom are green, but nevertheless this may be a
source of the inconsistency in the adapting direction and
magnitude of the leaves. Furthermore, leaves are often the
background elements of a scene, rather than the useful
object to be interacted with. This is particularly true when
we consider the evolutionarily relevant task of searching
for fruit amongst foliage. It is possible that the leaves have
little adaptive effect because they are not judged as relevant,
and therefore attended to. Perhaps the memory-color effects
from the green objects we chose are simply much weaker
than those of the bananas and carrots, and this is why we see
smaller and much more variable shifts.
Is the effect real?
The sizes of all the shifts are very small in relation to the
often-given size of one JND in CIE L∗a∗b∗ space, which
is 1.0 (although could be considerably larger, Mahy, Van
Eycken, & Oosterlink, 1994). However, compared to the
JNDs specific to our task estimated from the data, the shifts
do not seem as small. For example: the magnitude of the
shift was 69% of the corresponding JND, on average, for
the b∗ shift with the bananas images. We did not expect
to find large effects, since viewing achromatic images does
not lead to obviously visible after-effects that are noticeable
in normal viewing, as is also true for implied-motion
stimuli. However, despite considerable variation between
observers, the chromatic biases we measured do seem to be
in generally consistent directions for all observers for the
bananas and carrots images sets.
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The conflicting directions of the adapting effects, in some
cases, serves to weaken the evidence for adapting effects
from implied color. However, we do not believe that this is a
problem with our methodology. The ‘roving pedestal’ 2AFC
method (Morgan et al., 2013) that we use is ideally suited
to an experiment of this kind since it allows us to be much
more certain that our measurements are those of perceptual
biases. Had the observer been asked to simply make a
judgement of a single stimulus, then they might have based
their response on their expectation after identifying the
objects in the adapting set, which could be a symbolic cue.
Had the pedestal chromaticity always been the same, they
may have been able to identify it on each trial and this may
have influenced the decision. In addition, an adjustment task
in which the observer was required to adjust a stimulus so
that it appeared neutral or the same as their memory color
of an object would have not been appropriate, since viewing
that stimulus itself for any period of time would likely lead
to low-level adaptation effects greater than the effects that
we sought.
Comparison to other studies
We know of no other work that has attempted to show
adaptation to implied color or memory color, or that the
effect of the color implication lasts beyond the presentation
of the achromatic implying stimulus. We measure changes
in perception not of the memory color objects themselves,
but on simple geometric stimuli that are not presented at
the same time. We also use a different task that avoids
lengthy response periods, avoids response bias, and does not
explicitly measure an achromatic percept. However, there
are some other experiments that show similar features to
ours in their results. In particular, Olkkonen et al. (2008)
found smaller amounts of “over compensation” when
observers adjusted the color of a variety of images of fruit
and vegetables, including carrots and those that are typically
green, to appear achromatic than when they adjusted the
color of bananas. We also see a similarly weak effect from
our other images, relative to bananas. Indeed, bananas are
commonly used as stimuli in memory color experiments
(e.g., Tanaka and Presnell 1999; Biederman & Ju 1988;
Bannert & Bartels 2013; Olkkonen et al. 2008; Granzier
& Gegenfurtner 2012; Yendrikhovskij, Blommaert, & de
Ridder, 1999; Vurro, Ling, & Hurlbert, 2013), sometimes
they are the only real object used (Kanematsu & Brainard,
2014; Witzel, 2016), but they are notably absent from
(Bartleson, 1960). If we had limited our stimulus images
to bananas, we might have drawn stronger conclusions. It
is unclear as to why bananas illicit a particularly strong
memory color, since they change color (from green to
yellow to brown) as they ripen just as many other fruit.
It might be suggested that since the typical yellow of
bananas lies close to the daylight axis, an illuminant bias
is more readily accepted as a reason for a change in their
chromaticity but, as stated above, this seems inconsistent
with the results of our experiment.
Source of the top-down signal
Our experiment took the form of a typical visual adaptation
experiment, and we present observers with greyscale images
of objects with a typical color in the assumption that
these images will trigger the sensation of that color.
However, it might be argued that these images are not
necessary, and we need only ask our observers to imagine
an object without ever seeing it. Observers are able to
reproduce or select a color according to their internal
representation from a verbal instruction (Bartleson 1960;
Pe´rez-Carpinell, De Fez, Baldovı´, & Soriano, 1998), and
perhaps a command to imagine an object, or even simply a
color, would be sufficient to cause an adapting effect. This
experiment remains to be performed, but since the stimuli
described do not imply an illuminant, it might provide a
stronger means to determine between a normalisation vs.
illuminant compensation source of the effect. However,
when other researchers used stimuli that were degraded in
their similarity to the real objects (by using silhouettes)
they measured weaker effects (Olkkonen et al., 2008), so
perhaps an accurate representation of the object is necessary
to invoke memory color.
Conclusions
We provide some evidence that images that do not contain
chromatic information, but which imply color through the
memory color of the content of the image, can produce
perceptual biases that are similar to chromatic adaptation
to the real color. This evidence is weak, however, and we
remain cautious in drawing conclusions, particularly when
different mechanisms may be working in opposition.
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